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WHEN IN ROME, LOOK LIKE CAESAR? INVESTIGATING THE LINK BETWEEN 




Agency theory-grounded research on boards of directors and firm legitimacy has 
historically viewed CEO power as de-legitimating, often taking this fact for granted in theorizing 
about external assessors’ evaluations of a firm. With few exceptions, this literature has focused 
exclusively on capital market participants (e.g., investors, securities analysts) as the arbiters of a 
firm’s legitimacy and has accordingly assumed that legitimate governance arrangements are 
those derived from the shareholder-oriented prescriptions of agency theory. We extend this line 
of research in new ways by arguing that customers also externally assess firm legitimacy, and 
that firms potentially adjust their governance characteristics to meet customers’ norms and 
expectations. We argue that the cultural-cognitive institutions prevalent in customers’ home 
countries influence their judgments regarding a firm’s legitimacy, such that firms competing 
heavily in high-power distance cultures are more likely to have powerful CEOs, with CEO 
power a source of legitimacy—rather than illegitimacy—among customers. We also argue that 
the more dependent a firm is on its customers and the more salient cultural power distance is as a 
demand-side institutional norm, the greater this relationship will be. Data from 151 U.S. 




“The Company has found that in our industry having a combined Chairman and 
CEO is particularly advantageous when doing business internationally, especially 
with foreign government customers who value unified leadership and a single 
ultimate executive decision maker”  (Raytheon Company, 2010: 7) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance scholars have long argued that boards of directors can serve a 
legitimizing role for their organizations (e.g., Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Such a role is consistent with the 
resource dependence view of boards, with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) listing legitimacy as one 
of the primary factors that help reduce uncertainty and increase organizational access to 
externally generated resources. Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574), and is therefore a form of 
social judgment, existing only in the minds of external assessors (Bitektine, 2011). Scholars 
examining the legitimacy role of boards have historically focused on how boards “affect a firm’s 
legitimacy through perceptions of external assessors” (Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014: 303), 
with the main focus being on capital market participants and regulators as the key audiences. 
However, the above quote from Raytheon’s proxy statement indicates that cultural-
cognitive expectations of customers, especially those outside the focal firm’s home country, may 
be equally important for its corporate governance development. Legitimacy among customers, 
what we term “demand-side” legitimacy (cf. Priem, 2007), becomes even more important to 
consider when customers’ standards of legitimacy conflict with capital markets’ standards of 
legitimacy, as seems to be possible with regard to CEO power. This is particularly important for 
multi-national companies (MNCs) operating outside their home product markets but whose 
corporate governance is shaped by domestic institutions. At present, understanding of the 
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underlying theoretical mechanisms that link governance characteristics with the demand-side 
legitimation process is limited, and we aim to address this theoretical gap. 
In corporate governance research, the theoretical perspective most widely employed to 
identify external assessors and their associated standards of legitimacy has been agency theory 
(e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). Though agency theory focuses on 
economic efficiency rather than legitimacy, financial market participants’ general embrace of the 
agency logic has institutionalized agency theory-based governance prescriptions as standards of 
legitimacy in and of themselves (Bednar, 2012; Westphal & Graebner, 2010; Zajac & Westphal, 
2004). Given that agency theory emphasizes the board’s fiduciary responsibility to shareholders 
above all other concerns (Fama & Jensen, 1983), scholars adopting this theoretical perspective 
typically argue that low CEO power relative to the board is the most logical standard by which to 
judge a board’s legitimacy (e.g., Westphal & Graebner, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Though 
some scholars have argued for the benefits of CEO power from an organizational efficiency 
perspective (e.g., Boyd, 1995), studies specifically focusing on legitimacy typically adopt an 
agency-based perspective to the exclusion of other frameworks. 
Despite the value of this research stream, financial market participants are hardly the only 
stakeholders from whom firms must procure resources and support, and therefore are hardly the 
only assessors whose legitimacy judgments are salient to firm decision-making (Bitektine, 2011; 
Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Suchman, 1995). Agency theory’s dominance as a corporate 
governance logic has crowded out the consideration of non-stockholder-related external 
assessors who possess great power to confer legitimacy on a firm (for rare exceptions, see 
Hillman, 2005; Luoma & Goodstein, 1999), and who could potentially view CEO power very 
differently than financial market participants do. In particular, customers as a key group of 
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external assessors remain noticeably absent, not only from research on the legitimacy role of 
boards, but also from research on legitimacy in general (see Bitektine, 2011), and yet customer 
participation is indispensable to a firm’s continued existence, to say nothing of competitive 
advantage (Priem, 2007; Priem, Butler, & Li, 2013). So, if customers view a strong and powerful 
leader as more legitimate than one dominated by a strong board, agency theory offers few 
insights with regard to applicable norms and standards. Corporate governance scholars must, 
then, identify alternative theoretical bases for understanding the legitimacy standards of external 
assessors outside the financial markets. 
 Therefore, the present research draws on neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014) to develop and test a theoretical model of CEO power 
and legitimation in the eyes of customers. Developing such a model requires identifying factors 
likely to influence customers’ judgments about the legitimacy of a firm’s governance. As such, 
we focus our research on customers’ home culture and how neo-institutional theory predicts that 
culture will affect legitimacy judgments. We propose that U.S. firms will seek to match their 
CEOs’ power with the cultural-cognitive legitimacy standards that are dominant in the 
geographic regions in which they compete for sales (Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995) even when 
high CEO power contradicts the agency-driven perceptions of the investor community at home. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that firms selling their products in institutional environments 
characterized by a cultural-cognitive respect for power distance will exhibit greater CEO power 
on their boards, because CEO power carries legitimacy among the firm’s customers. 
To test this hypothesis, we collected panel data from 151 publicly traded U.S. 
pharmaceutical and semiconductor firms between 2003 and 2012, inclusive. We focused on these 
two industries because while they differ in many respects (e.g., product differentiation, market 
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concentration), they both are characterized by the presence of large, institutional customers (i.e., 
corporations and/or governments). The prevalence of such customers is an important boundary 
condition for our theory for two reasons. According to resource dependence theory as well as 
industrial organization economics (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Porter, 1979), large, 
institutional customers have significant power over their suppliers, and thus it is more important 
for the suppliers in such environments to be seen as legitimate. In addition, large, institutional 
customers are more likely to engage regularly with a firm’s top managers, CEO, and board of 
directors, thus making them more likely to be aware of the power structure atop the firm. 
Awareness is required for an external assessor to form a legitimacy judgment. 
 The present research contributes to theory and practice in four ways. First, we expand the 
current understanding of the legitimacy role of boards, which to date has focused predominantly 
on capital market participants as external assessors (e.g., Bell et al., 2014; Westphal & Graebner, 
2010). Specifically, we introduce the idea that boards conform to the institutional expectations of 
customers. Scholars rarely conceptualize boards as tools firms can use to manage demand-side 
uncertainty, but the results of our study suggest they should. The present research contributes to 
institutional theory more broadly, as little research has discussed the issue of legitimacy among 
customers in any context (Bitektine, 2011). We also expand knowledge of the legitimacy role of 
boards by drawing on resource dependence theory and research on institutional multiplicity to 
identify boundary conditions that help to contextualize the basic theoretical relationship we 
predict. We explore how the confluence of external, macro-institutional factors frames the firm’s 
response to demand-side, cultural-cognitive pressures by focusing on three such moderating 




 Second, existing research in comparative corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003, 2010) has argued that national institutions affect firm-level governance mechanisms, but 
this research focuses almost exclusively on home-country institutions (e.g., Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2011; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). We expand the focus of comparative corporate 
governance research and suggest that institutional characteristics of foreign product markets can 
also exhibit an association with a firm’s governance, even for firms incorporated and 
headquartered in the U.S. Therefore, we contribute to the “embedded governance” perspective 
by extending it from home to host countries (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Lubatkin, Lane, 
Collin, & Very, 2007). 
 Third, our research offers a unique perspective on CEO power. Agency theory 
unambiguously argues for the limitation of CEO power for maximum firm efficiency (Daily & 
Johnson, 1997). As a result, prior work examining the legitimacy role of boards has adopted the 
view that reductions in CEO power enhance firm legitimacy (e.g., Bednar, 2012; Westphal & 
Graebner, 2010), because such reductions correspond to the notion of  “pragmatic” (e.g., 
Suchman, 1995) or “instrumental” (e.g., Tost, 2011) legitimacy within agency theory-based 
institutional logics (Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). However, a cultural-
cognitive legitimacy perspective, such as we employ in this research, suggests that firms must 
meet the legitimacy expectations of all its main external assessors, including customers (Scott, 
2014). Our research indicates that, when competing in product markets characterized by high 
cultural power distance, cultural-cognitive legitimacy might actually require higher CEO power. 
This theoretical tension indicates that prior research has provided a rather restricted view on 
factors affecting CEO power, and our study helps to develop a more holistic approach to 
studying this key governance factor. 
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Finally, our research offers new knowledge for corporate governance practitioners such 
as institutional investors, proxy advisors and regulatory bodies since it provides a new 
perspective on the distribution of board power in an era of globalization. From a practitioner 
standpoint, our research suggests that the power balance on boards has implications for demand-
side legitimacy. As a result, stockholders and securities analysts who balk at the consolidation of 
CEO power should consider the potential benefits that such consolidation of power might grant 
the firm when competing in foreign markets. Of course, the factors influencing CEO power in 
large multinational firms are complex, incorporating home-country institutions and involving 
many stakeholders other than customers. As such, we caution scholars and practitioners from 
inferring from our study that demand-side cultural power distance affects CEO power in 
isolation. What our research does indicate, however, is that scholars and practitioners may be 
well-served by broadening their corporate governance schema to consider the role of customers 
in influencing power at the top. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Legitimacy Role of Boards 
Research on boards of directors has focused on the monitoring and/or the resource 
provision role that boards play at their firms (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003), with the agency theory-derived monitoring role garnering the most research 
attention to date (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Scholars viewing boards through an 
agency lens typically focus on issues related to executive compensation (e.g., Boyd, 1994), 
succession (e.g., Zajac & Westphal, 1996), risk-taking (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994), wrongdoing 
(e.g., O'Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 2006), and/or overall firm performance (e.g., Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Throughout the literature examining the monitoring role of 
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boards, the power of the CEO relative to the board features prominently (Daily & Johnson, 
1997), as agency theorists argue that CEO power inhibits the board’s ability to monitor 
effectively (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). 
 Less studied than the monitoring role, while still boasting an impressive literature, the 
resource provision role is grounded in resource dependence theory, which holds that boards’ 
primary purpose is to help the organization manage its external interdependencies in a variety of 
ways (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), such as influencing legislation and regulation in 
their favor (Hillman, 2005), or by co-opting important and influential stakeholder groups 
(Pfeffer, 1972). Hillman et al. (2009: 1408) summarize the four types of resources that boards 
can provide to their firms as “(a) information in the form of advice and counsel, (b) access to 
channels of information between the firm and environmental contingencies, (c) preferential 
access to resources, and (d) legitimacy.” Considerable empirical research over the course of four 
decades has demonstrated support for all four types of resources (e.g., Haynes & Hillman, 2010; 
Hillman, 2005; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). 
 While research on the board’s role in providing advice and counsel, access to 
information, and access to resources has proliferated since the publication of Pfeffer and 
colleagues’ (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) original work, research on the 
legitimacy role of boards remained for many years a widely assumed, but rarely tested, aspect of 
the theory. Only in the last several years have scholars begun to empirically test the proposition 
that boards of directors can serve as instruments of firm legitimacy (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 
2006; Certo, 2003). These scholars generally adopt an institutional theory perspective (Scott, 
2014), arguing that firms actually manipulate the structure and composition of their boards in 
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order to conform to norms and expectations of external assessors such as investors (e.g., Bell et 
al., 2014) and stock analysts (e.g., Westphal & Graebner, 2010). 
As a “generalized perception or assumption” (Suchman, 1995: 574), legitimacy is a 
socially constructed reality existing only in the minds of external assessors (Bitektine, 2011). 
While any assessor can form a legitimacy judgment of a firm and its governance, not all 
assessors’ judgments are equally salient to a firm’s board and CEO. If a given external assessor 
is not salient to the firm’s business, then whether that assessor views the firm as legitimate or not 
is immaterial to the firm’s ability to access resources and ensure its survival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014). Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that to achieve salience 
for firms, external assessors must have a legitimate claim on the organization, must possess the 
power to influence the organization, and must present a sufficiently urgent claim. Most scholars 
would agree that a firm’s “primary” stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, investors, 
suppliers) generally meet these criteria (e.g., Hillman & Keim, 2001); however, most work on 
corporate governance and firm legitimacy focuses only on legitimacy in the eyes of capital 
market participants. We build on this prior work by specifically examining legitimacy among 
customers, what we term “demand-side legitimacy” (cf. Priem, 2007). 
The extant literature on the legitimacy role of boards provides clear insights regarding the 
theoretical mechanisms involved in the legitimation process. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 145) 
observed that by appointing board members who reinforce institutional norms and values, a firm 
can “provide confirmation to the rest of the world of the value and worth of the organization”. 
Consistent with Scott’s (2014: 72) assertion that “the importance of legitimacy becomes 
immediately and painfully apparent only if lost,” most of the empirical work in this area focuses 
on firms suffering from a legitimacy deficit or a threat to existing legitimacy. 
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To study organizations with legitimacy deficits, scholars often focus on firms undergoing 
initial public offering (IPO). Certo (2003) argues that IPO firms can circumvent their liability of 
newness in capital markets by signaling organizational legitimacy to investors. IPO firms do this, 
he argues, through the appointment of prestigious directors (i.e., directors with significant human 
and social capital) to their boards (see also Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001). More recently, Bell et 
al. (2014) examine firms that not only suffer from a liability of newness in financial markets, but 
also a liability of foreignness, in that they go public on a stock exchange outside their home 
country (see also Bell, Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 2012). Bell et al. (2014) found that the legitimacy 
of foreign IPO firms differs depending on the configuration of both firm-level governance 
attributes—including the board—and home country institutions. 
When not analyzing firms facing a legitimacy deficit, research on the legitimacy role of 
boards typically focuses on firms facing a threat to existing legitimacy. For example, Arthaud-
Day et al. (2006) examine a sample of firms issuing financial restatements. Accuracy in financial 
reporting is a deeply held norm among U.S. publicly traded companies, and so firms having to 
restate their prior financial reports face a considerable loss to their legitimacy among investors 
and regulators. Building on prior research showing that firms dismiss executives to counter 
legitimacy threats (e.g., Boeker, 1992), Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) found that not only were CEOs 
and CFOs dismissed following the issuance of financial restatements, but outside directors 
experienced greater turnover as well. They concluded that boards can serve a legitimacy function 
by demonstrating outwardly visible accountability for the body charged with monitoring 
management. Of course, legitimacy in their framework consists of adherence to the agency 
theory-derived norms that predominate in the financial community. 
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Westphal and Graebner (2010) conducted one of the most complete tests of the strategic 
use of boards to bolster firm legitimacy. Arguing that negative appraisals from securities analysts 
threaten a firm’s legitimacy (see Zuckerman, 1999), the authors theorize that CEOs with 
influence over their boards’ nominating committees would respond to negative analyst appraisals 
by increasing the structural independence of their boards (i.e., higher percentage of outside 
directors). Westphal and Graebner’s (2010) analysis reveals that not only do influential CEOs act 
in a manner consistent with this theory, but securities analysts respond to increases in structural 
board independence by issuing more positive subsequent appraisals; this positive response 
occurs despite the fact that increases in the board’s structural independence had no effect on the 
board’s actual control over the CEO. Bednar (2012) found similar results examining media 
reporting rather than securities analysts’ reports. 
In their study of the dismissal of directors tied to financial fraud—echoing the work of 
Arthaud-Day et al. (2006)—Cowen and Marcel (2011: 511) provide a concise summary of the 
legitimacy role that boards play, a summary which fairly accurately reflects the extant body of 
work on the legitimacy role of boards: 
Both resource providers and the intermediaries that serve them…monitor board 
conduct and are sensitive to information that raises doubts about whether a firm 
warrants the commitment of resources or support. Given this, managers and 
directors pursue a strategic approach to board legitimacy by actively seeking to 
foster “perceptions of desirability, propriety and appropriateness” (Suchman, 
1995: 577). Boards protect their legitimacy by publicly adhering to norms of 
good governance, which signals their consonance with the interests and values of 
external audiences (emphasis added). 
 
Despite the great strides that governance scholars have made in recent years, research on 
the legitimacy role of boards remains nascent. One limitation with this body of work is that 
scholars have almost always assumed that the “norms of good governance” to which Cowen and 
Marcel (2011) refer derive solely from the prescriptions of agency theory. More specifically, this 
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body of research tends to suggest that the “resource providers and the intermediaries that serve 
them” are limited to capital market participants. 
As noted earlier, another core theoretical perspective on corporate governance is resource 
dependence. A key tenet of the resource dependence view on corporate boards is that a board has 
a formal obligation to help gain preferential access to resources that its firm needs to operate. “A 
board’s ability to do this effectively rests, in part, on the degree to which it can build and 
maintain legitimacy with external audiences that provide or mediate access to resources” (Cowen 
& Marcel, 2011: 510). Despite its explanatory power, however, the resource dependence 
approach to the study of boards’ legitimacy function has a number of theoretical shortcomings. 
First, this theoretical framework views legitimacy as a competitive advantage that accrues to 
companies able to obtain  and protect “superior” resources with their associated ongoing revenue 
streams, without any reference to the source of those streams (Priem, 2007). Second, by 
emphasizing value capture in factor markets—usually capital markets—this approach de-
emphasizes product markets as key arenas in which boards can actually create value for firms 
(Priem, Li, & Carr, 2012). Customers, however, must factor into firms’ resource dependence-
based governance considerations, because value creation for customers is integral to long-term 
firm success (Priem, 2007; Priem et al., 2013). 
Finally, previous studies on board legitimacy have yet to recognize the role of customer 
heterogeneity, especially with regard to cultural-cognitive institutions—that is, practices that 
external assessors view as comprehensible, recognizable, and culturally supported (Scott, 2014: 
60). In other words, models of board legitimacy rarely, if ever, take into account the possibility 
that customers’ standards of cultural-cognitive legitimacy differ from the agency theory-based 
normative standards of good governance to which Cowen and Marcel (2011) refer, such as 
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restraint on CEO power. However, since firms must create value for customers before they can 
capture value upstream in the business system (Priem, 2007), the potential for cultural-cognitive 
heterogeneity among customers raises the question of how board legitimation may differ when 
customers, rather than financial market participants, are the arbiters of board legitimacy. 
In sum, the demand-side framework of legitimacy suggests it is important that the 
organization conforms to the cultural-cognitive institutions of its customers, what Suchman 
(1995: 583) refers to as “the most powerful source of legitimacy identified to date”. 
Unfortunately, the extant literature generally pays little attention to cultural-cognitive forces, and 
no attention to demand-side cultural-cognitive forces. To initiate scholarship in this area, we 
identify customers’ home countries as a key source of cultural-cognitive institutions; thus, firms 
competing in multiple countries must contend with heterogeneous standards of cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy. As Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell (2005: 270) argue, “Although national boundaries 
do not always correspond with homogeneous value systems, there are strong forces within 
nations to create and maintain a shared culture… Adapting to local cultural values…may create 
an additional burden for multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in different countries”. 
Demand-Side Legitimacy 
 Cultural-cognitive legitimacy. Research linking the cultural-cognitive institutional pillar 
(see Scott, 2014) to boards of directors has focused almost exclusively on how the cultural-
cognitive institutions in a firm’s home environment influence firm decision-makers. A wealth of 
evidence exists to suggest that the culture of a firm’s home country influences the structure and 
composition of the firm’s board (e.g., Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Li & Harrison, 2008), as 
well as other aspects of the firm’s corporate governance (e.g., Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). 
Stewardship studies (e.g., Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) argue that national culture 
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(including cultural power distance) can influence the firm’s choice between agency and 
stewardship relationships and, hence, the extent of CEO power, although this research is focused 
on the roles of home country culture. In the context of boards’ strategic roles, however, the 
cultural-cognitive institutional pillar and its corollary concept of cognitive legitimacy (see 
Suchman, 1995) remain virtually unexplored. 
According to Scott (2014), the cultural-cognitive institutional pillar operates on a logic of 
orthodoxy, rather than of instrumentality or moral propriety. Whereas an organization pursues 
regulative legitimacy in order to demonstrate compliance with rules and normative legitimacy in 
order to demonstrate moral worth, it pursues cognitive legitimacy in order to reduce 
stakeholders’ uncertainty about the organization (Suchman, 1995). An organization possesses 
legitimacy within the cultural-cognitive sphere when external assessors of a firm’s legitimacy 
perceive the firm as acting—or just existing—in ways that are comprehensible, recognizable, and 
culturally supported (Scott, 2014: 60). By conforming to cultural-cognitive norms, firms can 
construct a social reality in which they are “predictable, consequentially legitimate organizations 
engaged in valued exchanges” (Suchman, 1995: 584). Organizations achieve this legitimacy, first 
and foremost, by mimicking the predominant organizational standards of the culture in which a 
firm is seeking to build legitimacy, conforming to a culture’s “structural template” of 
organizations (Scott, 2014: 74). 
 Cultural-cognitive elements are, according to Scott (2014: 79), “amenable to strategic 
manipulation.” For whom, though, is the firm manipulating these cultural-cognitive elements? In 
other words, who is the audience that evaluates a firm’s conformity to cultural-cognitive norms 
and thus confers legitimacy? According to Bitektine (2011), the most extensively studied 
audience-based types of legitimacy are media legitimacy and legitimacy with regulators; he also 
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lists legitimacy with investors, advocacy groups, and organizational insiders (i.e., employees). 
As far as we are aware, legitimacy with customers appears nowhere in the literature, with the 
exception of Luoma and Goodstein’s (1999) study, in which they included customers in an 
aggregation of all non-shareholder stakeholders. The dearth of research notwithstanding, 
customers are the audience that makes a first-order legitimacy judgment (Bell et al., 2014), and 
thus a firm needs customers to view it and its activities as legitimate if it is to continue earning 
revenues from them. When targeting overseas markets, the firm needs to understand and 
conform to “how local customers think, what they value, how they behave” (Webb, Ireland, Hitt, 
Kistruck, & Tihanyi, 2011: 574).  
Cultural power distance and CEO power. In the literature on boards of directors, the 
power dynamic between the CEO and the board has garnered more research attention than any 
other board attribute by far (e.g., Daily & Johnson, 1997; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). According to Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella 
(2009), the CEO’s power on the board is an integral component of agency theory-based board 
research, which is why it has featured prominently in prior studies of boards’ legitimacy among 
investors and analysts (e.g., Westphal & Graebner, 2010). In addition, while the balance of board 
legitimacy research has treated CEO power as de-legitimating, some scholars and practitioners 
argue that the benefits of a single, strong CEO outweigh the risk of agency abuses (e.g., 
Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Dalton & Dalton, 2009; Krause & Semadeni, 2013), especially 
in the context of high environmental uncertainty (e.g., Boyd, 1995). CEO power’s prevalence in 
the board legitimacy literature and ambiguity regarding its effects on the organization make the 
construct an ideal board attribute to examine as we develop our theoretical model. What remains 
to be determined, then, is what cultural-cognitive institution firms are most likely to use as a 
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standard for maximizing the demand-side legitimacy of their CEO’s power. To answer this, we 
look to the literature on national culture and cultural power distance. 
Power distance is one of Hofstede’s (1980a, 1980b) core dimensions of national culture, 
and as such, comparative corporate governance scholars frequently use it to predict national 
differences in corporate governance norms and standards (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010), including 
CEO compensation (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004), CEO discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011), 
and board structure and composition (Li & Harrison, 2008). Power distance as a general concept 
refers to the difference in status and influence between people in an organization (Hofstede, 
1980a); at the level of a national culture, power distance refers to “the extent to which a society 
accepts the fact that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 
1980b: 45). In nations with high power distance cultures, organizational structures characterized 
by a strong centralization of power are likely to enjoy greater cultural-cognitive legitimacy than 
are organizational structures characterized by evenly distributed power. 
Therefore, we expect that firms will attain greater cultural-cognitive demand-side 
legitimacy to the extent that the power dynamic on their boards matches the cultural-cognitive 
respect for power in their product markets. Customers in nations with high power distance 
cultures will view the firm as comprehensible (Scott, 2014; Suchman, 1995) to the extent that the 
CEO wields clear power over the board (and the firm). Customers who appreciate power 
distance will comprehend a powerful CEO more fully, seeing the CEO as a single decision-
making authority. The reverse applies to customers in nations with low power distance cultures.  
The idea that CEO power can actually grant the firm legitimacy with customers has 
emerged in the literature on board leadership structure. In their review of the CEO duality 
literature, Krause, Semadeni, and Cannella (2014: 280) noted that in some cultures, “a CEO who 
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does not also serve as board chair might be perceived as weak and ineffective,” such that for 
many multinational firms, combination of the CEO and board chair positions “might be the 
pivotal signal that secures their legitimacy in foreign markets.” In the introduction to this 
research, we provided one illustration of this phenomenon with defense contractor Raytheon’s 
explanation for investing the power of the chair position in its CEO. Similarly, L-3 
Communications argues in its proxy statement that pressures to seek international sales have 
made consolidation of CEO power more important for legitimacy purposes: 
With the expected declines in the US Department of Defense budget, it has 
become more important than ever for L-3 to seek out business opportunities in the 
international community. In L-3’s industry, the Board of Directors believes that 
access to decision-makers in foreign countries is made easier when the roles of 
Chairman and CEO are combined as their customs often dictate having 
comparable titles when conducting negotiations. (L-3 Communications Holdings 
Inc., 2013: 31) 
 
We expect that many firms who do business with institutional customers in foreign 
markets adopt a perspective similar to Raytheon’s and L-3’s, and alter the power balance on their 
boards to match the cultural-cognitive institutions prevalent in their product markets. This 
process might involve combining or separating the CEO and board chair titles (e.g., Krause & 
Semadeni, 2014), increasing the CEO’s stock ownership (e.g., Core & Larcker, 2002), or 
changing the proportion of independent directors (e.g., Westphal & Graebner, 2010). While we 
highlight cases of firms specifically identifying CEO duality as a mechanism for managing 
demand-side legitimacy, board independence and CEO equity are also discretionary sources of 
CEO power that—research has shown—external observers take into account when evaluating 
firms (e.g., Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Sources of 
power are combinative, as evidenced by the fact that Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) found that 
boards tend to match CEO duality with high board independence and CEO non-duality with low 
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board independence so as to keep CEO power at a moderate level. Truly high CEO power results 
from the combination of contributing factors (Daily & Johnson, 1997), and so the reflection of 
demand-side cultural-cognitive institutions is likely to manifest in an aggregate of visible firm 
attributes. Therefore, we predict that demand-side exposure to cultural power distance will lead 
firms to exhibit greater levels of CEO power. 
Hypothesis 1. CEO power is positively related to demand-side cultural power distance. 
 
Boundary Conditions 
While we expect that CEO power will generally reflect the firm’s demand-side exposure 
to cultural power distance, we also recognize that firms differ in terms of external legitimation 
pressures and in their responses to those pressures. Institutional theorists recognize that 
organizational interests and capacities do not exist independent of the external environment (e.g., 
Edelman & Suchman, 1997), including the organization’s industry and target markets. We build 
on this research and suggest that the process of legitimation is framed by the firm’s industry and 
market characteristics, which impact either the extent of the firm’s resource dependence or the 
legitimacy challenges associated with institutional polycentrism.   
Geographic concentration of sales. The legitimacy role of boards is grounded in 
resource dependence theory, because legitimacy is considered a necessary condition for firms to 
access resources from external organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995). 
However, some firms are more resource-dependent on their customers than others, and as Cowen 
and Marcel (2011: 512) argue, “greater dependence on external audiences increases a board’s 
need to defend its legitimacy”. Though all firms rely on their customers for resources, firms that 
compete in multiple countries are less resource-dependent on a particular national group of 
customers (Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006), making demand-side legitimacy a less 
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salient concern than it is for firms that compete in only a few countries. As we discussed above, a 
boundary condition on the legitimacy role of boards is that stakeholders must have sufficient 
power over the firm to justify legitimation activities at the board level (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Large, institutional customers meet this criterion, and thus they provide the context for our 
theory. However, even large customers’ power is reduced if the firm must interact with a wide 
array of customers spread across the globe. 
Consistent with resource dependence theory, we argue that firms are more dependent on 
their customers, and are therefore in greater need of legitimation, when their customer base is 
geographically concentrated than when it is spread across many countries. In a study of boards’ 
resource provision role, Boyd (1990: 420) argued that “as a firm becomes more dependent on its 
environment, the firm may adapt by acquiring additional access or control over resources.” Boyd 
(1990) focused on linkages with the environment as a means of acquiring access to resources, but 
as we have argued, legitimacy is another means through which boards can secure access to 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995). Reliance on a small set of large, 
institutional customers reduces the firm’s bargaining power (Porter, 1979), and as such, increases 
the importance of maintaining and/or building legitimacy with those customers. Therefore, we 
offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between demand-side cultural power distance 
and CEO power is positively moderated by the geographic concentration of the firm’s 
product markets. 
 
Cultural variance. Geographically dispersed sales weaken the effect of demand-side 
cultural power distance, because they reduce the firm’s dependence on a particular customer 
group. Even if the firm is dependent and thus faces a demand-side legitimacy imperative, 
however, it remains unclear whether cultural power distance is a salient institutional norm 
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through which to secure such legitimacy. One factor that confounds the effect of institutional 
forces on organizational activity is the fact that many organizations operate within multiple, 
conflicting institutional environments (Kraatz & Block, 2008). When a firm’s structures and 
processes can be segmented and localized, adaptation to cultural norms is relatively feasible 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). With a corporate board of directors, however, the firm has but one 
lever to manipulate so as to achieve maximal cultural-cognitive legitimacy in all its markets. 
Therefore, the legitimating effect of CEO power should be stronger the fewer conflicting 
cultural-cognitive institutions the firm faces. According to Scott (2014: 73), “Actors confronting 
conflicting normative requirements and standards typically find it difficult to take action since 
conformity to one undermines the normative support of other bodies.” 
Institutional theorists argue that external assessors make legitimacy judgments in “action 
spaces” where individual entities interact socially. However, one problem with legitimacy 
studies is that “research has unnecessarily focused on single-dimensional definitions of 
institutional contexts, thereby implying that each firm is embedded in a single institutional 
environment… Yet many firms’ institutional contexts are actually multidimensional, and 
opportunities and constraints confront firms not only from their primary institutional 
environment, but also from others in which they are simultaneously embedded” (Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007: 33). Overlapping external factors may affect interactions in action spaces, in line 
with the “institutional polycentrism” framework (Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011). As 
Ostrom (2010: 647) argues: “The set of external variables impacts an action situation to generate 
patterns of interactions and outcomes that are evaluated by participants in the action situation.” 
In our arguments leading to Hypothesis 2 we suggest that the concentration of a firm’s 
geographic markets may affect the relationship between demand-side cultural power distance 
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and CEO power. In addition, firms may vary in the degree to which their foreign markets share 
similar cultural-cognitive characteristics; variance among a firm’s foreign markets provides 
another theoretical mechanism affecting our core relationship. If the firm’s foreign sales are split 
among countries with widely varying institutional environments, the marginal benefit of adapting 
CEO power to any one particular country’s cultural understanding of power distance—or an 
aggregate of all of them—is relatively low, and may even be negative if it reduces the firm’s 
legitimacy in countries with incompatible cultures. In such cases, a firm is more likely to rely on 
the cultural-cognitive institutions in its home country, as the home country institutional forces 
will weigh more heavily on executives’ and directors’ decision-making than will a cacophony of 
demands from divergent cultural institutions. Hence, we suggest the following moderating role 
of the variance in demand-side cultural power distance the firm may face: 
Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between demand-side cultural power distance 
and CEO power is negatively moderated by the variance in demand-side cultural power 
distance across the firm’s geographic markets. 
Industry bargaining power. Considerable research has demonstrated that levels of 
resource-dependence differ by industry (e.g., Boyd, 1990; Boyd, 1995), and it is therefore 
important to consider what differences might exist between the two industries we examine and 
how these differences might impact the link between demand-side cultural power distance and 
CEO power. As Finkelstein (1997: 808) indicates “Both established industry patterns of 
response, and variability in the extent to which firms in some industries may benefit from 
reducing constraint, affect the likelihood that strategies designed to reduce dependencies will be 
employed.” One key driver of industry variability in terms of demand-side resource dependence, 
specifically, is firms’ bargaining power over their customers. Greater bargaining power makes 
firms less dependent on their customers for resources (Porter, 1979, 1980), and thus reduces the 
importance of demand-side legitimation. 
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Industries attain bargaining power over customers to the extent that they offer 
differentiable products. As Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995: 1429) argue, “In a differentiable 
industry, there is a wide array of decision domains…means-ends linkages are relatively complex, 
and hence, a wide range of options are acceptable to stakeholders”. In such industries, the 
pressure to conform to customers’ expectations and demands weakens, fostering greater 
diversity, both at the product level and at the organizational level. In the context of legitimacy, 
this suggests that firms in industries with high bargaining power over customers face less 
pressure to adjust their board characteristics to fit customers’ cultural-cognitive expectations. 
In our theorizing, we made an effort to integrate our study context with theoretical 
arguments. We chose the semiconductor and pharmaceuticals industries as our study context 
because both industries met the primary boundary condition of our theory, which is that for CEO 
power to serve a legitimating function, firms must sell primarily to large, institutional customers. 
At the same time, while both industries meet the key assumption of our theory, they differ in 
terms of bargaining power over their customers, with semiconductor firms enjoying far less 
market power than pharmaceutical firms, ceteris paribus, due to the unique nature of 
pharmaceutical products. So, we predict that semiconductor firms will seek demand-side 
legitimacy through CEO power to a greater extent than pharmaceutical firms will, because 
semiconductor firms face greater demand-side resource dependence. 
 While not universal, pharmaceutical firms generally offer a portfolio of branded products, 
each of which provides the firm with near-monopoly bargaining power for the length of its 
patent. Even off-patent pharmaceutical products can potentially offer firms some monopolistic—
or at least oligopolistic—bargaining power due to the idiosyncratic nature of drug compounds. 
Patients who have the same affliction may require different firms’ products for treatment 
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depending on how the specific compounds affect them. As such, institutional buyers of 
pharmaceuticals must re-stock products from a wide array of firms, even if the products treat the 
same illness. In addition, pharmaceutical firm customers tend to be non-branded wholesalers that 
act as intermediaries between manufacturers and pharmacies. This reality affords pharmaceutical 
firms considerable bargaining power relative to their customers. 
 In contrast, although semiconductor firms frequently patent their products, patents 
provide them with only minimal monopolistic bargaining power due to the high rate of 
technological change in the semiconductor industry (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Innovations occur 
much more frequently in the semiconductor industry, and are driven primarily by applied 
research, whereas innovation in the pharmaceutical industry generally begins with basic research 
(Lim, 2004). The rapid advancement in technology in the semiconductor industry reduces 
semiconductor firms’ ability to extract rents from their customers because the benefits a given 
firm’s product offers to the customer over competitors’ products will be short-lived. Also, 
whereas pharmaceutical firms generally sell branded products to homogeneous wholesalers, 
semiconductor firms generally sell homogeneous products to customers with well-known brands 
(Gartner, 2015), creating the inverse resource-dependence relationship. 
Demonstrating cultural-cognitive legitimacy through CEO power is a means of achieving 
firm-level differentiation through greater comprehensibility to customers. In doing so, the firm 
reduces its resource dependence on customers—at least as far as the resource of legitimacy is 
concerned—and somewhat compensates for lack of bargaining power. Therefore, we predict that 
CEO power will be more reflective of demand-side cultural power distance in industries with 
low bargaining power over customers (e.g., semiconductors) than in industries with high 
bargaining power over customers (e.g., pharmaceuticals). 
25 
 
Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between demand-side cultural power distance 
and CEO power is greater for firms in industries with low bargaining power over 
customers (e.g., semiconductors) than for firms in industries with high bargaining power 
over customers (e.g., pharmaceuticals). 
 
METHODS 
Study Context and Sample 
Consistent with the theoretical rationale previously developed, we limited our sample to 
publicly traded U.S.-incorporated firms in the pharmaceutical (SIC 2834) and semiconductor 
(SIC 3674) manufacturing industries. Firms in both industries normally sell to large, institutional 
customers. The sample includes all firms with data available in both the Compustat and 
Corporate Library databases; we limit the sample to those firms reporting their sales broken 
down by specific countries. Our theory focuses on how a firm’s demand-side exposure to the 
cultural-cognitive institution of power distance influences the power of the firm’s CEO. Since 
large pharmaceutical and semiconductor firms typically compete in several countries with 
varying cultures, it is important to ascertain a firm’s demand-side exposure to specific countries 
so as to determine the relative importance of a particular country’s culture. To do this, we 
obtained net sales broken out by country from Compustat’s Historical Segments database, and 
obtained cultural power distance values for a specific national market from the Global 
Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) Phase 2 2004 dataset (for 
recent usage, see Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013), as well as Hofstede’s (2013) VSM 
2013 dataset. Financial data were obtained from Compustat’s Annual Fundamentals database, 
and all firm-level governance data were obtained from the Corporate Library’s Directors and 
Companies databases. After excluding observations with missing data, our sample consisted of 




 Dependent variable. Our dependent variable was the power of the CEO on the board of 
directors at a focal firm in a given year. We operationalize CEO power as a summative index of 
three widely used measures, consistent with recent approaches to capturing CEO power (e.g., 
Cannella & Shen, 2001; Krause, Priem, & Love, In Press). The components of this index 
included CEO duality, measured as a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 reflecting a 
combined CEO/board chair and a value of 0 reflecting a separate CEO and board chair 
(Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994); board independence, measured as the percentage of board 
members classified as independent (Westphal & Graebner, 2010); and CEO stock ownership, 
measured as the percentage of outstanding firm stock owned by the CEO (Boeker, 1992). We 
selected these components because, unlike other sources of CEO power, these components are 
mostly discretionary. Boards can choose to separate or combine their CEO and board chair 
positions (e.g., Krause & Semadeni, 2013), increase or decrease board independence (e.g., 
Westphal & Graebner, 2010), and increase or decrease a CEO’s equity stake in the firm (e.g., 
Core & Larcker, 2002). Given that our theory assumes firms manipulate CEO power 
strategically, it is important that such manipulation is at least possible. 
To create our composite index, we standardized all components, reverse-coded board 
independence because it is a measure of the board’s power over the CEO (Westphal & Zajac, 
1995), and summed the components together. We believe it is important to use a summative 
index to measure CEO power because the components we use, which are among the most 
common measures, are typically considered sources of CEO power (e.g., Daily & Johnson, 
1997); in other words, they each contribute to power individually. As such, many firms will 
impose checks on CEO power by limiting some of these components but not others (Finkelstein 
& D'Aveni, 1994; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). The power a CEO gains from each component, 
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then, is distinct from the power the CEO gains from each other component. Nevertheless, as a 
robustness check we created an alternative measure using principal components factor analysis. 
The results remained robust to this alternative measure, and so we are confident that our measure 
is a valid reflection of CEO power. 
Independent variable. Our primary independent variable is the firm’s demand-side 
exposure to cultural power distance. We followed several steps to measure this construct. First, 
we obtained the percentage of a firm’s net sales emanating from specific countries. Firms 
provide this information in their annual reports if sales in a particular country are sizable enough 
to mention. There is, however, no standard system for classifying countries, and so firms report 
the information in completely different formats. Therefore, we obtained the information from 
Compustat’s Historical Segments database, but the nature of these data required that we code 
each listed country by hand, as firms use many different names for the same country—often with 
typographical errors. We specifically focus on sales because our theory relates to legitimacy 
among customers, and thus the influence of a given set of customers’ cultural-cognitive 
expectations on firm behavior must be weighted by the importance of those customers to the 
firm’s overall sales. In addition, within the Historical Segments database, net sales is one of the 
most complete data fields, slightly more complete than—and highly correlated with—revenues. 
As a robustness check, we used revenues instead of net sales, and the results did not change. 
Once we had the percentage of each firm’s sales emanating from specific countries, we 
matched these percentages with cultural power distance values to create a sales-weighted average 
of each firm’s demand-side exposure to cultural power distance. To ascertain country-specific 
cultural power distance, we incorporated data from two separate sources. Studies examining 
national cultural power distance have historically relied on Hofstede’s (1980a) measures, 
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available in the VSM 2013 dataset. These values exist on a 100-point scale, with higher values 
indicating greater cultural power distance. In recent years, however, Hofstede’s measures have 
come under intense criticism with regard to their construct validity (e.g., Javidan, House, 
Dorfman, Hanges, & de Luque, 2006). As such, we relied primarily on the most widely used 
alternative to Hofstede’s measures, the GLOBE measures (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & 
Gupta, 2004). The GLOBE data include a measure of cultural power distance that is modeled on 
Hofstede’s, but based on a different original survey instrument and a different original survey 
population. The GLOBE measure of cultural power distance is also provided on a different scale 
than Hofstede’s. We used Hofstede’s measure of cultural power distance only when GLOBE 
data were not available for a specific country. Doing this required scaling them to the same range 
of values. We did this by regressing the GLOBE data on the Hofstede data and obtaining 
predicted values. These predicted values had the same distribution as the originals, but now 
existed on a common, intuitive 100-point scale. 
In some cases, firms report sales for a group of countries, especially if the sales to any 
one particular country are not large enough to mention. This lack of specificity could potentially 
pose a problem, as countries could be grouped together that have completely divergent cultural 
power distance values. In such a case, averaging power distance values across countries would 
make little sense, and so we set a decision rule for our analyses. If the standard deviation of the 
cultural power distance values for all the countries in such a grouping was less than 15, which is 
the standard deviation for all countries’ power distance values (i.e., the countries in the group all 
share relatively similar cultural power distance values), then we averaged the power distance 
values across countries and included the observation; if not, we dropped the observation. As a 
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robustness check, we also tried using the maximum power distance value among the grouped 
countries, and the results remained the same. 
Sales are also frequently provided by region (e.g., “Eastern Europe”) in the Segments 
dataset, rather than by country. Unfortunately, we could not include these data, as the countries 
involved are ambiguous. The one exception we applied to this rule was that we chose to 
recognize “North America” as an average of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Including 
or excluding these cases had no bearing on our final results. To determine the extent of 
information lost due to excluding regional segments, we examined the percentage of sales 
reported by country for firms in our sample. Only 12.5 percent of firms in the segments dataset 
for our two industries reported country-specific sales accounting for less than 50 percent of total 
firm sales. For the other 87.5 percent of firms, country-specific segments accounted for over half 
of total reported firm sales, and for 65 percent of firms, country-specific segments accounted for 
over 70 percent of reported firm sales. As a robustness check, we ran our models excluding the 
12.5 percent for which country-specific segments accounted for less than 50 percent of sales, and 
separately excluding the 35 percent for which country-specific segments accounted for less than 
70 percent of sales, and our results remained robust under either condition. 
With country-level cultural power distance measures calculated, we then multiplied the 
cultural power distance value for each country, including the United States, by the percentage of 
sales a firm derived from the respective country, creating a weighted cultural power distance 
value. For each firm-year observation, we summed the weighted values across all countries to 
create a weighted average of the firm’s demand-side exposure to cultural power distance in that 
year. This weighted average served as our primary independent variable, demand-side cultural 
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power distance, which is abbreviated “DSCPD” in the results. To reduce collinearity, the 
DSCPD measure was standardized prior to analysis. 
Moderating variables. In addition to our primary independent variable, our theoretical 
framework included three moderating factors: the geographic concentration of a firm’s product 
markets, the variance in demand-side cultural power distance, and industry. We calculated 
product market geographic concentration using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of each 
firm’s sales to different countries. We relied on the same geographic segments data used to 
create the measure of a firm’s exposure to cultural power distance. We constructed the HHI by 
squaring the percentage of a firm’s sales in each country for each year, and then summing these 
squared percentages, so that the HHI had a potential minimum value of 0 and a potential 
maximum value of 1. A value of 1 would indicate that all revenues emanate from the same 
geographic location, and a value of 0 indicating that sales are evenly distributed across an infinite 
number of locations. To reduce collinearity with the demand-side cultural power distance 
measure, we standardized the HHI prior to analysis. We measured the variance in a firm’s 
demand-side cultural power distance as the standard deviation of cultural power distance values 
across all countries in which a firm competed in each year. Finally, we accounted for industry 
with a dichotomous variable labeled “Pharmaceuticals”, which took a value of 1 for firms in the 
pharmaceuticals industry and a value of 0 for firms in the semiconductors industry. 
Control variables. Our analyses included several control variables so as to rule out 
alternative explanations for variance in CEO power. Older and larger firms are more likely to be 
on institutional investors’ radar, leading to a higher opposition to power concentration. They also 
may have developed a larger internal resource base to buffer their dependence on external 
resources. To account for this potential opposition to power concentration, we measured firm 
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size as the natural log of the number of people (in thousands) employed at the firm in a given 
year. For a similar reason, we included firm age measured as the number of years the firm has 
been in business. Prior agency-grounded research has identified a number of governance factors 
that may affect CEO power.  To account for these alternative explanations we included a 
dichotomous variable for institutional ownership, with a value of 1 indicating that institutional 
investors (e.g., pension funds) collectively owned a majority of firm stock, and a value of 0 
indicating that institutional investors did not. Family- and founder-led firms often allocate 
considerable power to their CEOs, so we included a dichotomous variable that took a value of 1 
if the firm was family- or founder-controlled and a value of 0 otherwise. In addition, because 
older CEOs might be able to accumulate or command greater power than younger CEOs, we 
included a control for CEO age in years. This variable was standardized prior to analysis to 
reduce collinearity. Longer-tenured CEOs are also more likely to accumulate power as we have 
measured it than are shorter-tenured CEOs. As such, we controlled for the number of years the 
CEO has been in that position. 
Firm performance can impact a CEO’s power, so we controlled for firm performance in 
two ways. First, because firms in financial distress are more likely to reduce CEO power (Daily 
& Dalton, 1995), we controlled for a firm’s risk of bankruptcy with Altman’s Z (Altman, 1968). 
Second, to account for firm profitability, we controlled for return on assets (ROA). Also, because 
prior work has demonstrated that firms respond to pressure from securities analysts with changes 
in CEO power (Westphal & Graebner, 2010), we controlled for the median analyst rating for 
each firm in each year, ranging from 1 (Strong Sell) to 5 (Strong Buy). This variable was 
standardized prior to analysis to reduce collinearity. Finally, we included year fixed effects in all 
our models to account for contemporaneous correlation (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). 
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Method of Analysis 
 We relied on the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) to test our 
hypotheses. Scholars have employed GEE extensively in recent corporate governance studies 
(e.g., Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). The method is well-suited to examining differences between 
firms with multiple observations over time because it allows for error terms to be correlated 
within groups (Ballinger, 2004). We specified an identity link function and a Gaussian 
distribution for our dependent variable, as the measure of CEO power was continuous and 
normally distributed. We also specified an exchangeable error correlation structure. In all our 
analyses, the independent variables were lagged one year behind the dependent variable. 
 In addition, we included in our models an inverse Mills ratio to account for any selection 
bias resulting from the fact that some firms in the industries we examine did not report the 
geographic sources of their sales in a manner conducive to coding for cultural power distance 
(see Greene, 2008). Out of 1,142 observations available in The Corporate Library datasets for the 
two industries we studied, we were able to match 833 with demand-side cultural power distance 
data. After adding control variables to our models, the number of observations dropped to 801. 
To account for possible selection bias, we predicted selection from the population of 
pharmaceutical and semiconductor firms, specifying a probit model with two exclusion 
restrictions: logged total firm revenues and Tobin’s Q. The results of the probit analysis, 
available upon request, revealed that observations included in the sample exhibited higher 
revenues (β = 0.29, p < 0.001), and lower Tobin’s Q (β = -0.10, p < 0.001). We derived the 




 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for our variables. Tables 
2 and 3 provide the results of the GEE models in which we tested our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 
states that a firm’s demand-side exposure to cultural power distance is positively associated with 
the power of its CEO. As Model 2 shows, the coefficient for the main effect of demand-side 
cultural power distance is positive and significant (β = 0.17, p < 0.05), providing support for 
Hypothesis 1. The main effect is positive and statistically significant in all models, gaining in 
magnitude and significance as interaction effects are added, suggesting further support for the 
theory we have articulated. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
 Hypothesis 2 states that the effect of demand-side cultural power distance is positively 
moderated by the geographic concentration of a firm’s product markets. As Model 3 shows, the 
coefficient for the interaction term is positive and significant (β = 0.34, p < 0.01), providing 
support for Hypothesis 2. In Figure 1, we have plotted predicted values of CEO power at 1 
standard deviation above and below the mean of both independent variables. As the figure 
shows, the positive relationship between demand-side cultural power distance and CEO power is 
very strong when the firm competes in geographically concentrated markets and almost non-
existent when the firm competes in geographically dispersed markets. 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Hypothesis 3 states that cultural variance will negatively moderate the relationship 
between demand-side cultural power distance and CEO power. As Model 4 shows, the 
coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant (β = -0.06, p < 0.05), providing 
support for Hypothesis 3. The interaction retains its significance when the other interactions are 
added to the model, adding further empirical support. In Figure 2, we have plotted predicted 
values of CEO power at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean of both independent 
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variables. As the figure shows, the relationship between demand-side cultural power distance and 
CEO power is positive regardless of whether cultural variance is high or low, but the relationship 
is more positive for firms facing low variance. Therefore, we interpret the results as providing 
empirical support for Hypothesis 3. 
Finally, Hypothesis 4 states that industry will moderate the relationship between demand-
side cultural power distance and CEO power, such that the effect will be greater for 
semiconductor firms than for pharmaceutical firms. As Model 5 shows, the coefficient for the 
interaction term is negative and significant (β = -0.52, p < 0.001), providing support for 
Hypothesis 4. In Figure 3, we have plotted predicted values of CEO power at 1 standard 
deviation above and below the mean of demand-side cultural power distance for each industry. 
As the figure shows, the relationship between demand-side cultural power distance and CEO 
power is positive for both industries, but is clearly more positive for semiconductor firms. 
Therefore, we interpret the results as providing empirical support for Hypothesis 4. 
Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 About Here 
In Table 3 we include full models. As Model 8 shows, when all interactions are included 
in the model, the coefficient for the interaction of demand-side cultural power distance and 
geographic concentration loses significance. We anticipated that this might be due to the 
relatively strong negative correlation between geographic concentration and cultural variance—
which is to be expected, given the theoretical relatedness of the constructs—and so we specified 
the full model, with either the cultural variance interaction or the geographic concentration 
interaction excluded. These models are shown in Models 6 and 7, respectively. As Model 6 
shows, without the cultural variance interaction included, the geographic concentration 
interaction retains significance. We interpret our results as still demonstrating empirical support 
for Hypothesis 2, with the caveat that in the full model, the interaction loses significance. 
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Insert Table 3 About Here 
Robustness Checks 
 We conducted several robustness checks following our analyses. We acknowledge that 
the correlations between our independent variable and our moderator variables are high, and thus 
introduce the potential for multicollinearity. On concerns that multicollinearity might be biasing 
our results, we obtained the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for our models. The mean VIF was 
2.20 and the VIF for demand-side cultural power distance was 2.32. Therefore, we are fairly 
confident that multicollinearity does not threaten the validity of our findings. We also tested our 
interaction hypotheses using subgroup analyses rather than multiplicative terms, and found the 
same support for our hypotheses. In addition, on concerns that autocorrelation might be present 
in our data, we re-tested our hypotheses specifying an autoregressive error correlation structure 
of order 1 in our GEE models, and the results did not change. We also tested the hypotheses 
using random-effects regression instead of GEE and obtained similar results. Finally, we ran the 
models without the inverse Mills ratio, and the results were unchanged. As such, we are 
confident that our model specification is not biasing our findings. 
We were also concerned that our analyses might suffer from reverse causality; that is, 
firms might seek out markets to which their CEO’s level of power is most suited culturally. 
While this possibility does not altogether contradict our theory—firms would still be pursuing 
legitimacy through CEO power—it calls into question what is the stimulus and what is the 
response in the firm’s pursuit of legitimacy. To determine the presence of endogeneity, we 
conducted the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, consistent with best practice recommendations 
(Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2014). Our instruments included the two from the selection test 
plus the percentage of firm sales derived from outside the United States. This additional 
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instrument is empirically strong and theoretically meaningful, as firms with a greater percentage 
of foreign sales are likely to differ in demand-side cultural power distance than are firms with 
mostly U.S. sales. At the same time, the percentage of sales that are foreign is unlikely, by itself 
to impact CEO power. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was far from significant (F = 1.45, p = 
0.23), and as such, we find no evidence of reverse-causality threatening our results. 
DISCUSSION 
Implications for Theory 
By focusing on the role of board governance as a mechanism to gain legitimacy, our 
research raises a number of theoretical questions and makes several contributions. First, this 
research brings an important, but largely ignored, group of external assessors into the discussion 
of boards’ legitimacy role: non-shareholder customers. By introducing  customers as grantors of 
firm legitimacy, we acknowledge that firms routinely contend with multiple, and often 
competing, institutional forces (Kraatz & Block, 2008). In the context of research on gaining 
legitimacy through governance, our analysis offers a broader perspective on the roles and 
functions of firm-level governance compared to previous studies grounded in agency and 
resource-dependence perspectives. We argue theoretically and explore empirically an assumption 
that, apart from the capture and protection of rents associated with factor markets, governance 
may also be an integral part of the cultural-cognitive mechanism of value creation for non-
shareholder customers who are concerned with products rather than stock-prices. Margolis and 
Walsh (2003: 284) call for a reorienting perspective that illuminates this “point of tension,” and 
they encourage inductive, normative theory to clarify the competing considerations, probe what 
gives them weight, and explore their relationship “to craft a purpose for the firm that builds 
internal coherence among incommensurable objectives, duties, and concerns.” By suggesting a 
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role for foreign customers in determining the legitimacy of a firm’s leadership, we offer a richer 
perspective on the antecedent factors of firm-level governance systems. 
Second, corporate governance researchers increasingly recognize that governance 
depends both on country-level as well as firm-level factors (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, & 
Williamson, 2009), and the effectiveness of firm-level governance systems is contingent on the 
institutional environments in which firms operate (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 
2010). The country-level governance mechanisms include a country’s laws, its culture and 
norms, and the institutions that enforce the laws. However, previous studies have focused mostly 
on how the firm’s governance parameters are affected by its home country institutions (Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2003, 2010). We expand comparative governance research by suggesting that it is 
also important to consider host country institutional effects, especially when firms participate in 
global markets. Our evidence suggesting that the firm’s exposure to high cultural power distance 
in its product markets may materially affect the power of its CEO represents an important 
extension of comparative corporate governance research. This is a particularly important finding 
considering that MNCs operate in foreign markets, but prior research has primarily focused on 
the link between MNCs’ corporate governance and their domestic institutions. Our study, 
therefore, complements other research examining the spread of agency theory ideas (most 
notably equity-based compensation) into non-U.S. countries (e.g., Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). 
This research had outlined a process whereby “organizations learn from other institutional 
contexts, import practices that have gained legitimacy elsewhere but that transgress local pillars 
of legitimacy, and spread through organizational networks in a way that results in the possible 
gradual legitimization of institutionally contested practices” (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007: 51). 
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Although we use a different theoretical lens, we make a similar argument that corporate 
governance decisions are influenced by foreign perceptions of legitimacy.  
Third, our research brings fresh insights on CEO power and legitimacy. Prior research 
has typically viewed lower CEO power as increasing firm legitimacy, in a vein consistent with 
agency theory (Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Shareholders, however, are only one group of 
external assessors whose legitimacy judgments the firm must court; other external assessors may 
not even evaluate a firm according to agency norms at all. The evidence presented here suggests 
that in product markets characterized by high cultural power distance, external assessors actually 
expect high CEO power. Thus, we urge corporate governance scholars not to assume that all 
external assessors in all institutional environments evaluate CEO power the same way. We 
further contribute to research on board legitimacy by identifying moderating factors drawn from 
both resource dependence theory and research on institutional polycentrism. These moderating 
factors have significant theoretical importance since they allow contextualization of the firm’s 
legitimation process through board characteristics. 
Implications for Practice  
This study also contributes to practice. Board independence and heightened CEO 
accountability have become widely accepted features of “good corporate governance” codes 
around the world (Bell et al., 2014). For example, the OECD (2004: 63-64) asserts that 
“Separation of the [CEO and board chair] posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can help 
to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and improve the board’s 
capacity for  decision making independent of management”. Institutional investors, proxy voting 
advisors, and regulators advocate for greater board power over the CEO as a solution to 
governance-related problems (Monks & Minow, 2008). Our paper, however, provides a new 
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perspective on the distribution of board power in the era of globalization. From a practitioner 
standpoint, our research demonstrates that firms can use CEO-dominated boards to gain 
legitimacy in foreign product markets where power distance is an acceptable norm. As a result, 
shareholders, securities analysts, and corporate governance advisors should carefully weigh the 
potential costs and benefits of a specific board configuration vis-à-vis product markets where the 
firm operates, since potential gains from restraining CEO discretion in terms of reduced agency 
costs may not necessarily outweigh a loss in legitimacy when competing in certain cultures. 
Despite being focused on CEO power, our theorizing is also highly relevant for debates 
concerning other governance factors which may be sensitive to cultural-cognitive legitimacy 
judgments, such as director nationality or gender. Our research also indicates that the regulator’s 
and investor’s evaluations of board effectiveness should move from the currently predominant 
consideration of structural characteristics embedded in various codes of “good governance” to a 
more contextualized approach that takes into account not only institutional characteristics of 
product markets the firm operates in but also firm contingencies, such as geographic 
concentration of sales, cultural variance, and industry. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions  
Our study is subject to limitations that suggest promising avenues for future research. 
First, though we tested for possible endogeneity, our key assumption about firms matching CEO 
power with demand-side cultural power distance can manifest via two potential mechanisms, in 
line with Suchman (1995): the firm could alter its CEO’s power to match the cultural power 
distance of its geographic markets, and/or the firm could target geographic markets with cultures 
that are likely to find the power of its CEO more comprehensible (i.e. legitimate). It is important 
to acknowledge either possibility, because while CEO power is the channel through which a firm 
40 
 
seeks cultural-cognitive legitimacy along the power distance dimension in our framework, 
neither CEO power nor exposure to demand-side cultural power distance is universally 
malleable. Thus, while many firms arguably have more control over the power dynamics on their 
boards than they do over the geographic segmentation of their sales, a firm with very inert CEO 
power might seek cultural-cognitive legitimacy by focusing sales efforts on customers who 
comprehend and appreciate the firm’s relatively fixed level of CEO power (Moore, Bell, 
Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 2012). Therefore, future research may explore possibility that the 
relationship we find between CEO power and demand-side cultural power distance is the product 
of a continuous and iterative combination of adjusting CEO power to match demand-side 
legitimacy standards with targeting certain geographic markets to achieve the best fit with the 
firm’s level of CEO power. 
Second, our use of geographic segment-based sales data to create a measure of demand-
side cultural power distance relied on a strong assumption with regard to what those data reflect. 
We used a firm’s sales to a specific country, as a percentage of total sales, to reflect the firm’s 
exposure to the cultural-cognitive institutions of that country. Doing so is based on the 
assumption that the individuals making the actual purchases included in those sales were, in fact, 
located in the specified country. It is possible, however, that a firm sold its product in one 
country, but interacted with a purchasing agent in a different country. For example, a 
pharmaceutical firm may have sold its product to Walmart’s retail operations in South America, 
but interacted with a purchasing agent in Arkansas when making the sale.
1
 Unfortunately, a lack 
of granular customer data prevents us from identifying the specific location of purchasers, so the 
link between cultural cognitive institutions and geographic segments as provided by Compustat 
                                                          
1
 We thank an anonymous AMJ reviewer for highlighting this possibility and for providing the example. 
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remains a strong assumption of this study. We see an opportunity for more in-depth research to 
focus on the exact location of customers and thereby more accurately assess the influence of 
demand-side cultural-cognitive institutions on firms’ structures. 
Third, the present research is limited in that we focus solely on demand-side institutions 
and demand-side legitimacy. We noted a gap in the existing resource dependence and corporate 
governance literatures with regard to customers, legitimacy, and strategic leadership; we sought 
to address this specific gap. However, firms must maintain legitimacy among all their salient 
stakeholders if they are to function properly (Mitchell et al., 1997; Suchman, 1995), and thus it is 
likely that in some contexts, other stakeholders’ legitimacy judgments impact firm decisions with 
regard to CEO power and other board attributes. It is possible that some firms face supply-side 
legitimation concerns, wherein it is imperative that suppliers view them as comprehensible and 
appropriate. The theory and data required to develop and test hypotheses related to this 
speculation are different from what is in the present research, but we hope that future research 
extends the framework we have identified to include stakeholders other than customers.  
Finally, we develop our theoretical and empirical analyses in the context of firms that sell 
their products primarily to large, institutional customers. Although this covers a substantial 
number of organizations engaged in B2B and B2G (“business-to-government”) transactions, 
there may be a question with regard to the generalizability of our framework. Bell et al. (2012) 
however, argue that any firm operating in foreign markets is subject to the close scrutiny of its 
primary stakeholders, with governance attributes included as the objects of scrutiny. In addition, 
we were not able to distinguish sales to businesses from sales to governments, as such fine-
grained data were not available. Future studies can add value by differentiating among types of 
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non-shareholder customers, such as government agencies, large local business partners, or 
professional associations, with regard to each type’s contributions to “demand-side legitimacy”. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior studies suggest that national institutions play an important role in shaping firm-level 
governance. By focusing on demand-side legitimacy, rather than legitimacy in capital markets, 
we hope to expand the boundaries of inquiry into the legitimizing role that CEOs and boards play 
at their firms, as well as to further understanding of the firm’s relationship with the multiple 
institutions in its environment. CEO power, our results suggest, is not only a source of agency 
costs, but can in fact constitute a legitimizing attribute for certain customer segments. We hope 
that future corporate governance research will take note of the present study and draw demand-
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Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 CEO Power -0.19 1.33              
2 DSCPD 52.17 2.49 0.04             
3 Geographic 
Concentration 
0.26 0.14 0.02 -0.49            
4 Cultural Variance 2.59 2.72 0.12 0.64 -0.41           
5 Pharmaceuticals 0.65 0.48 -0.07 0.49 -0.43 0.28          
6 Institution-Owned 0.73 0.44 -0.12 -0.01 -0.25 -0.03 -0.03         
7 CEO Tenure 8.38 7.63 0.31 0.11 -0.14 0.18 0.18 0.06        
8 Founder/Family Firm 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.13 -0.16 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.25       
9 CEO Age 54.14 8.31 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.18 -0.02 0.40 0.06      
10 Firm Size 0.62 1.87 0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.14 0.14 0.33 0.01 0.09 0.10     
11 Median Analyst Rating 2.51 0.61 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 0.00 -0.12 0.05 -0.12    
12 Altman's Z 7.14 10.13 0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.01   
13 ROA -0.01 0.24 0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.92  
14 Firm Age 31.01 29.84 0.00 -0.18 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.35 -0.05 0.03 0.12 0.59 -0.07 0.01 0.00 




GEE Models of CEO Power 












 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.39 0.42 0.53 0.48 0.58 
























 (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) 
Family/Founder Firm 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
†
 












 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Firm Size -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Median Analyst Rating 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Altman’s Z 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Firm Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 









 (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
Cultural Variance     0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 






















  (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) 
DSCPD X Geographic 
Concentration   0.34
**
   
   (0.12)   
DSCPD X Cultural 
Variance    -0.06
*
  
    (0.02)  
DSCPD X 
Pharmaceuticals     -0.52
***
 
     (0.15) 
Observations 801 801 801 801 801 
Number of Firms 151 151 151 151 151 
χ
2
 282.42 288.01 300.79 297.04 307.20 
Standard errors in parentheses; Year dummies omitted for parsimony; all t-tests for significance are two-tailed 




GEE Models of CEO Power 








 (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.65 0.65 0.69 
































 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Firm Size -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Median Analyst Rating 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Altman’s Z 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Firm Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 








 (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 
Cultural Variance     0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
















 (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) 
DSCPD X Geographic Concentration 0.28
*
  0.20 
 (0.12)  (0.13) 





  (0.02) (0.02) 







 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Observations 801 801 801 
Number of Firms 151 151 151 
χ
2
 315.97 316.83 321.19 
Standard errors in parentheses; Year dummies omitted for parsimony; all t-tests for significance are two-tailed 
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